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tortfeasors." 404 The Conference Report suggested that since contribu-

tion between active intentional tortfeasors joined in an action was not
prohibited under the former CPLR 1401, there is no absolute policy
bar to contribution in the area of intentional torts.405 Accordingly, it
would seem that there is no justifiable reason for limiting contribution to unintentional torts.
Retroactivity
The Court of Appeals, in Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co.,400
extended the applicability of Dole to any litigation pending on the
date of that decision.40 7 As a result of the subsequent liberal interpretation of Kelly by lower courts, defendants have asserted their
rights to a Dole apportionment at various stages of litigation. 40 8 Even
where the main action was tried pre-Dole and no claim for apportionment was asserted until the appellate level, courts have deemed such
cases still pending and have remanded them for apportionment of
4 09
damages among joint tortfeasors.
404Id. at 1806.
405 Id. The report acknowledged that the Revised Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act does not permit contribution among intentional tortfeasors, but found
unpersuasive the reasons offered therein for such a prohibition. Id., citing UNiFoam CONTIBUTION AMON( TORTFEASORS A-r § l(c) & Comment (rev. 1955).
406 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
407 Kelly involved an appeal by an active tortfeasor from the dismissal of his crosscomplaint. Between the time of the original dismissal and the appeal, Dole was decided.
The Court of Appeals reinstated the cross-complaint, stating, "We, of course, . . . give
effect to the law as it exists at the time of our decision." Id. at 29 n.3, 286 N.E.2d at 243
n.3, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 854 n.3. See also Rodgers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 553,
300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973); Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 764, 284
N.E.2d 579, 333 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1972).
408 For a discussion of Dole's application to pending cases, see 3 WK&M $ 3019.62;
Tymann & Samore, Torts, in 1973 Survey of New York Law, 25 SYRACusE L. Rv.433,
433-34 (1974); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent Developments, 48 ST. JoHN's L.
Rav. 195, 202-03 (1973); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent Developments, 47 ST.
JOHN'S L. Ry . 759-60 (1973).
.409 See Stein v. Whitehead, 40 App. Div. 2d 89, 92, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826 (2d Dep't
1972), wherein the appellate court, in an action commenced prior to Dole, noted that
"even in the absence of a cross-claim I think the trial court should, sua sponte, charge
the jury that it should determine the proportionate responsibility of each defendant .. "
Similarly, in Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1st Dep't
1972), the First Department apportioned damages among joint tortfeasors despite a prior
pre-Dole dismissal of the third-party complaint. In Liebman v. County of Westchester
41 App. Div. 2d 756, 341 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep't 1973), the court, in granting apportionment, noted that the plaintiff's recovery would be temporarily delayed but considered
this to be of minor significance as compared with the predominant consideration of "fairness in the judicial management of the case." Id. at 757, 341 N.YS.2d at 570, quoting
Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 NXE.2d 288, 295, 331 N.YS.2d 382, 391
(1972). Absent apportionment, the possibility of prejudice can be far greater to the joint
tortfeasors.
However, the Court of Appeals, in Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E2d 622,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 202 (1973), refused
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Notwithstanding the trend to broadly interpret the term "pending cases," the question remained as to whether Dole would apply
retroactively where a defendant's previous complaint for indemnification had been dismissed, based on pre-Dole law, and the time for
appeal of the dismissal had expired. More specifically, the issue involved the use of the doctrine of res judicata to preclude judicial consideration of a similar complaint based on Dole principles if the main
action was still pending. Lower courts had previously diverged on this
question. The Appellate Division, Second Department, permitted a
third-party plaintiff to reargue the dismissal of his third-party complaint 17 months after dismissal. The court proceeded to reinstate the
complaint in accordance with Dole principles. 410 The Supreme Court,
Monroe County, however, dismissed a second third-party complaint
41 1
for indemnity, relying on the doctrine of former adjudication.
to apply the law as it then existed when a pre-Dole settlor sued for apportionment of
damages in a pending action. The Court reasoned that "it would be inappropriate on
these facts to undo what has been done and, on the basis of present law, to nullify
actions taken by parties in reliance on the law as it then stood." 82 N.Y.2d at 844, 298
N.E.2d at 629-30, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 471. But see Lampila v. Harrington, 76 Misc. 2d 423,
351 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN's L.
Rrv. 657 (1974), wherein the court permitted a third-party action by a defendant who had
settled pre-Dole after a verdict had been rendered against him on the trial level. Codling
was distinguished on the ground that it involved a "voluntary" settlement and not one,
as here, coerced by entry of an unfavorable verdict.
Although the Court of Appeals has never held Dole inapplicable to cases concluded
prior to Dole, such a result could be implied from the Court's holding Dole applicable
to cases pending on the date of that decision. See notes 406-08 and accompanying text
supra. Codling would appear to support such reasoning. In such a case, it would be
inappropriate to apply Dole because of the substantial impact its application would have
on current court caseloads. For example, it would re-open cases concluded as long as
twenty-six years ago. This result obtains from New York decisions which hold that a
defendant's right to a Dole contribution accrues at the date he pays the judgment rather
than at the date the judgment is rendered. A defendant, therefore, who is not pressed
for payment until almost twenty years after the judgment in the main action is docketed
against him (see CPLR 211(b) (McKinney 1972), allowing a twenty-year period to enforce
a money judgment), has an additional six years to commence his third-party action. (A
Dole claim is treated as one for indemnity, to which the six-year statute of limitations of
CPLR 213 applies.) Moreover, prejudice would result to those who relied on past law
and are no longer in a position to obtain the evidence necessary to properly defend themselves in an action to determine their relative responsibility. See Welborn v. DeLeonardis,
168 N.Y.L.J. 3, July 6, 1972, at 2, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (court refused to apportion
damages in an action brought for contribution under CPLR 1401). But see Lampila v.
Harrington, 76 Misc. 2d 423, 351 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974) (allowing
an independent action for apportionment among co-defendants and a third party where
the main action had been settled after an adverse judgment but before Dole). See generally Occhialino, Contribution, in NiNurarrss ANNUAL REPoRT oF THE JunDciAL CONFERENCE 219, 247-59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Contribution]; 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 8019,
supp. commentary at 246-47 (1974).
410 Mosca v. Pensky, 41 App. Div. 2d 775, 342 N.Y.S.2d 76 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.);
accord, Glicksman v. Smith, 168 N.Y.L.J. 108, Dec. 7, 1972, at 2, cols. 2-3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County) (third-party plaintiff allowed to serve second complaint).
411 Glomboski v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 72 Misc. 2d 552, 338 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.
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Recently, the Court of Appeals, in Slater v. American Mineral Spirits
Co., 41 2 resolved the conflict by holding that although the main action
is currently pending, Dole does not apply retroactively to issues that
have been judicially concluded.
In Slater, a third-party complaint for indemnification had been
dismissed on the then-applicable law which barred one active tortfeasor from impleading another. The dismissal was not appealed and
an order dismissing the complaint was entered. After the decision in
Dole, a second complaint was served by the defendant, the main action
having not as yet come to trial. The Court of Appeals, in a four-tothree decision, held that since the first dismissal was a final disposition
on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata foreclosed any attempt to
reopen the issues based upon a subsequent change in decisional law. 413
The majority distinguished Kelly since an appeal from the original
dismissal in the present action had not been made. Consequently, the
order was conclusive as to the rights between the parties. 414 Judge
Jasen, however, writing for the dissent, urged that the effect of Dole
is so fundamental that it "warrants retroactive application in a pending case even in which, as here, the effect may be to defeat the purposes underlying the doctrine of former adjudication ....415
Monroe County 1972) (mem.). The court compared the second complaint to a motion for
reargument after a motion has been decided and the time to appeal has expired. In
striking down the complaint, it cited 2 CARmODY-WArr 2d § 8:81, at 100-01 (1965), which
concludes that leave to reargue will ordinarily be denied despite an intervening change
in case law. But see 3 WK&M
3019.62, which approved of the Glicksman resolution to
the problem and urged that Glomboski not be followed.
412 33 N.Y.2d 443, 310 N.E.2d 300, 354 N.YS.2d 620 (1974).
413 Id. at 446-47, 310 N.E.2d at 301-02, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 622-23. The majority relied on
earlier cases in which the question of retroactivity had been raised. Spindell v. Brooklyn
Jewish Hosp., 29 N.Y.2d 888, 278 N.E.2d 912, 328 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1972) (prior adjudication
that the action is barred by the statute of limitations bars a subsequent action following
a change in the law); In re Huie, 20 N.Y.2d 568, 232 N.E.2d 642, 285 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1967)
(motion for reargument should not be permitted following a United States Supreme Court
decision once the time for appeal has expired); and Deeves v. Fabric Fire Hose Co., 14
N.Y.2d 633, 198 N.E.2d 595, 249 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1964) (motion for reargument must be
denied even though the law was changed to allow an action against the manufacturer
for a breach of warranty). Each of these cases is distinguishable, however, since each
involved a request for relief on the identical theory that had earlier been rejected. In
Slater, all that had been determined was that the third-party plaintiff was actively negligent and therefore had no claim for common law indemnification. See notes 416-19 and
accompanying text infra.
41433 N.Y.2d at 447, 310 N.E.2d at 302, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 623. Unlike the dissent, the
majority attached no significance to the difference between a final order, as was the case
in Slater, and a final judgment. See note 415 infra.
415 Id. at 448, 310 N.E.2d at 303, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 624 (Jasen, Rabin and Stevens, J.J.,
dissenting). The dissent also noted that since a defendant's right to indemnification theoretically accrues at the time he pays the judgment, the third-party plaintiff is denied his
rights before his cause of action accrues. Id. at 449, 310 N.E.2d at 303, 354 N.Y.S.2d at
625, citing Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964). The
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Regretfully, neither the majority nor dissenting opinion dealt
with what would seem to be the most significant question, viz., whether
416
both complaints were, in fact, based upon the same cause of action.
The Court of Appeals has itself noted that Dole did not change the
rule of common law indemnification but was instead a "refinement of
the law of contribution." 417 Thus, it would appear that the prior dismissal of the indemnity claim, resulting from the active negligence of
the third-party plaintiff, should not serve to bar a subsequent claim
for "relative contribution. 418 Certainly, before Dole, a defendant,
despite dismissal of his request for indemnification, could recover
against a joint defendant under former CPLR 1401 after paying more
than his pro rata share of the judgment. 419 If Dole was intended to
refine and expand former CPLR 1401, the fact that the third-party
defendant in Slater was not a party to the main action should not alter
the result.
In view of the prior liberal application of Dole in other pending
cases, the Slater decision seems strikingly harsh. Had an appeal of the
dissent also viewed the order as merely the law of the case and not res judicata, as would
be a final judgment.
416 Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Bk-C Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456
(1929); Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N.Y. 345 (1881). Whether two causes of action are to be
regarded as identical depends upon whether a contrary result in the second would impair
rights established in the first. Andrews v. Merrywood Country Club, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d
865, 281 N.Y.S.2d 922 (2d Dep't 1967).
417 Although the Dole court spoke in terms of "partial indemnification," in Kelly v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972), the
apportionment was described as a "refinement of the rule of contribution" and the action
one for "relative contribution." Id. at 39, 286 N.E.2d at 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 855. In
Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 533, 300 N.E.2d 403, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1973),
the Court again distinguished between a Dole apportionment and full indemnification.
One commentator has indicated "that Dole, while working in the framework of implied
indemnity, actually varied [and expanded] the rule of contribution." Contribution,supra
note 409, at 242.
418 See note 413 supra. Dismissal of a complaint for indemnification merely determines
that the defendant was actively negligent and his sole remedy, if available, is for statutory
contribution. See note 419 infra.
419 Indemnity and contribution have always been regarded as separate and distinct
remedies. See Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 308, 178 N.E. 289, 290
(1931); Perlbinder v. D'Aquilla Bros. Contracting Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 790, 177 N.Y.S.2d
878 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), affd mem., '7 App. Div. 2d 968, 183 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Ist
Dep't 1959); Bonadonna v. City of Buffalo, 156 Misc. 225, 281 N.Y.S. 343 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1935). Under pre-Dole common law principles, a defendant would be entitled to
full indemnity if he were "passively" negligent; where "actively" negligent, contribution
was his sole remedy. Contribution, however, was available only against one or more cotortfeasors who were subjected to a joint judgment and only after the defendant had
paid more than his pro rata share of that judgment. CPLR 1401 (McKinney 1963), as
amended, N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 1 (McKinney). Baidach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d
128, 164 N.E.2d 373, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959) (construing CPA 211-a, the predecessor to
CPLR 1401). For an explanation of the "active-passive" dichotomy, see McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1962). See generally Note, Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 185 (1972).
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dismissal by the third-party plaintiff been pending on the date Dole
was decided, his complaint would have been reinstated upon reaching
the appellate level.4 20 Alternatively, had he made no complaint there-

tofore, he would be permitted to do so now.42 1 Even under Slater, he
would not be barred from serving a complaint on another tortfeasor
who could then obtain apportionment against the third-party defendant.4 22
Though Slater represents a new clarification on the issue of Dole's
retroactivity, it can be construed as only a narrow limitation. As noted
by the majority, it does not disturb the application of Dole to pending
cases where no final judgment or order on the issue of indemnity has
been entered.423 Furthermore, it leaves unanswered the question of
whether a tortfeasor against whom a judgment was docketed before
Dole can now seek apportionment. 424 Admittedly, it would seem anomalous to allow such a tortfeasor recovery while denying it, as in Slater,
to a defendant in an action that has not yet come to trial. Still, considering the emphasis placed on the finality of the unappealed order,
it appears that Slater alone would not preclude such a tortfeasor from
acquiring an apportionment of damages provided the issue of indemnification between the two parties had not been finally determined.
Undertakings
CPLR 5519(a)(2) grants an appellant who has fied an undertaking guaranteeing full payment of a judgment entered against him a
stay of enforcement of the judgment pending the outcome of the
420 See Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 337 N.Y.S2d 685 (Ist Dep't

1972).
421 See Glomboski v. Baltimore &cO.R.R., 72 Misc. 2d 552, 338 N.YS.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1972) (mem.), cited in 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019, commentary at 303
(1974).
422 83 N.Y.2d at 446, 310 NXE.2d at 301, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 622.

Id. at 447, 310 N.E2d at 302, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
Such an application of Dole was considered in Lampila v. Harrington, 76 Misc. 2d
423, 351 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974), wherein a tortfeasor who had satisfied the judgment against him before Dole was allowed apportionment against another
tortfeasor who had not been in the original action. With respect to joint tortfeasors
against whom there was a judgment pre-Dole, see Welborn v. DeLeonardis, 168 N.Y.L.J.
3, July 6, 1972, at 2, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972), limiting the co-defendants to
contribution under CPLR 1401 as then enacted. For a discussion of this question, see
Farrell & Wilner, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where?, 39
B'KLYN L. Rnv. 380, 335-39 (1972), wherein the authors urge retroactivity to judgments
within a six-year statute of limitations period except with respect to defendants subject
to joint judgments where contribution under CPL. 1401 would apply. Professor David D.
Siegel urges retroactivity even between tortfeasors against whom there is a common judgment. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 303-04 (1974).
428
424

